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COMMENTS
By far the more comprehensive of these efforts is the Lou-
isiana Code of Civil Procedure. The major changes in the pro-
cedural law which it will make have already been explained at
a number of Institutes conducted by the Louisiana State Bar
Association throughout the state. As helpful as these Institutes
have been to the Bench and Bar of Louisiana, limitations of time
have restricted these expositions of the new procedural Code to
a series of panoramic surveys, and have prevented any "explora-
tion in depth" of particular procedural concepts.
In this symposium, some members of the editorial staff of
the Louisiana Law Review present detailed studies of some of
the procedural rules of the new Code. The areas selected for
these critical studies represent those segments of the new Code
in which the largest number of major changes are concentrated.
A procedural system, no matter how painstaking its redaction
or admirable its design, cannot provide an effective base for
the administration of justice for any extended period if it re-
mains static. A procedural concept or device bottomed on social
and economic conditions prevailing at the time of its adoption
may lose much or all of its original efficacy when these condi-
tions change. For this reason, the study of the procedural system
must be both a critical and a continuous one, so that necessary
modifications or replacements may be made as soon as the need
thereof becomes evident. I sincerely hope that this symposium
commences that critical and continuous study of the Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure which I feel is absolutely necessary if
the Code is to continue to serve the purposes of its adoption.
Henry G. McMahon
Louisiana State University Law School
November 23, 1960
Procedural Delays
The purpose of this Comment is to set forth the provisions
in the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure relative to procedural
delays and to point out the changes which are made in the former
law. For convenience the Comment is divided into twelve sec-
tions which cover both the new and the former law.
ANSWER
Generally the delay for filing an answer was governed by
articles of the Code of Practice, in effect requiring that a de-
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fendant answer within ten days after service of citation, with
one additional day granted for each ten miles from the defend-
ant's home to the place of trial, up to an overall maximum of
fifteen days.' These articles also allowed the defendant ad.di-
tional time to plead in the discretion of the trial judge, Finally.
the defendant could answer within ten days after the disposition
of exceptions. 2
Article 1001 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedures re-
quires the defendant to file an answer within fifteen days after
service of citation, or within ten days after exceptions filed
prior to answer are overruled or referred to the merits. How-
ever, the court may grant additional time to plead. This article
does away with. the allowance of additional time for answering
based on the distance from the court and fixes a flat period of
fifteen days.
Aside from the general rules for answering, several special
rules deserve attention: (1) Therewas no precedural rule for-
merly. as to when an answer to an incidental demand had to be
filed, and, in some instances, no answer was required at all. 4
Article 1035 of the new Code requires that the answer in an
incidental action shall be filed in the same delays as that allowed
by Article 1001, or at any time prior to a default judgment in
the incidental action. 5 This recognizes the existence of an answer
to incidental actions and definite delays for this answer. (2)
Notwithstanding the general provisions, the law formerly al-
lowed the defendant to file his answer at any time prior to the
confirmation of a default against him. 6 No change is made in
this provision by the new Code.7 (3) The Code of Practice pro-
vided that the garnishee must answer within the usual delay.8
The delay for answering a garnishment interrogatory is fixed
at fifteen days in the new Code. 9 This change adopts the flat
1. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE arts. 180, 316 (1870).
2. LA. R.S. 13:3344 (1950).
3. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1001 (1960).
4. LA. R.S. 13:3385 (1950) allowed the third party defendant to answer. Ar-
ticle 384 of the Code of Practice required an answer to an intervention. There was
a conflict on answer in a reconventional demand. See Loew's Inc. v. Don George
Inc., 227 La. 127, 78 So.2d 534 (1955). See Comment, 21 LOUISIANA LAW RE-
VIEW 220 (1960).
5. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1035 (1.960). The word default in this
article refers to a preliminary default, and not confirmation of a final judgment
by default,
6. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE arts. 314.'317 (1870).
7. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1002 (1960).
8. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 262 (1870).
9. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2412 (1960).
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period of fifteen days, which is the same as the general delay
for answering.
Under the new law, the delay for answering in city courts is
five days, exclusive of legal holidays, from the date of service. 10
This represents a change in the law, since formerly there were
different provisions depending upon the location of the court.
Thus, in New Orleans the delay for answering was fixed at three
days," and in the rest of the state it was ten days after serv-
ice. 1 2 The Revised Statutes provided for one other situation
which merits mention. In all parts of the state except New
Orleans, where concurrent jurisdiction existed betwen the dis-
trict court and the justice of the peace court and where the
amount involved was under $100, the procedure used was gen-
erally the same as was used in city courts. When the defendant
did not answer timely, or had confessed judgment, a final judg-
ment could be rendered and signed by either the judge or the
clerk of the district court.13 When the clerk rendered the judg-
ment he had to note all the documents and oral evidence in a
book, known as the clerk's book.14 Articles 4971 and 4972 of
the new Code make no change in the procedure in cases falling
under the clerk's book statute.
APPLICATION FOR A NEW TRIAL
Under both the former law and the new law, the delay for
applying for a new trial depends in part on the date of the rendi-
tion and signing of the judgment. Formerly, 5 all judgments,
the civil district court of New Orleans excepted, had to be signed
within three calendar days of rendition. According to Code of
Practice Article 546 the judge in New Orleans could not sign
a judgment until three judicial days after rendition of the judg-
ment. An application for a new trial or rehearing had to be
filed (1) in Orleans Parish before the judgment was signed, and
(2) in the rest of the state either before the judgment was signed
10. Id. arts. 4895, 4921, 4922, 5002. Apparently, Article 5002 applies to all
parts of the state. It should be noted there is no difference based on the amount
of the dispute, whether over or under $100.
11. LA. R.S. 13:1951, 1877, 1971 (1950); LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 1082
(1870). It should be noted there is no difference based on the amount of the
dispute whether over or under $100.
12. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 1082 (1870).
13. LA. R.S. 13:3331-3347 (1950).
14. This statute was known as the clerk's book statute. The Reporter's Com-
ments after Articles 4941 and 4942 of the new Code point out that justices of the
peace in these cases would use this same city court procedure.
15. LA. R.S. 13:4212 (1950).
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or within three days of rendition if the judgment had been
signed before this three days expired."' There were certain ex-
ceptions to these rules. The Code of Practic provided two excep-
tions to the allowance of three days from rendition :17 (1) Where
the judge signed the judgment in a different parish from that
where the case was tried, the procedural delays did not com-
mence until the clerk of the parish where the case was tried
issued notice of the judgment to the sheriff and he served the
notice on the parties or their counsel. (2) If any party or
attorney of record in any cause was a nonresident of the parish
in which the cause was pending, he could deposit fifty cents and
require notice of the judgment by the clerk before the delays
-commenced. There was another exception found in the Revised
Statutes, which provided that in all matters taken under advise-
nment by the judge, the clerk of court had to notify all litigants
of the entry of any order or judgment.18 The three-day delay
for applying for a new trial did not commence until this notice
of rendition by the clerk.
The time of the rendition and signing of the judgment has
been changed in the new Code. Article 1911 provides: "Except
as otherwise provided by law, all final judgments shall be read
and signed in open court." It should be noted that no time limit
is imposed on the judge, but it is contemplated by the redactors
that the judge will sign within a reasonable time. Article 1913
requires that "notice of the signing of a default judgment against
a defendant on whom citation was not served personally, and
who filed no exceptions or answer, shall be served on the de-
fendant by the sheriff. Notice of the signing of all other final
judgments shall be mailed by the clerk of court of the parish
-where the case was tried to the counsel of record for each party,
.and to each party not represented by counsel." Article 1974 pro-
vides that the delay for applying for a new trial shall be three
days, exclusive of holidays, the delay commencing to run on the
day after the clerk has mailed notice of the judgment. Conse-
,quently the time for applying for a new trial is made uniform
and the necessity of complying with the various exceptions in
order to obtain notice of the judgment before the delays for
16. Id. 13:4213. See also Comment, 21 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 228 (1960).
17. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 543 (1870).
1& LA. R.S. 13:3344-3345 (1950). These statutes required notice where the
-case was taken under advisement. There would appear to be some question as to
whether the court would have granted additional time where the clerk failed to
give the required notice. However, it is submitted that additional time would have
,been granted.
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applying for a new trial begin to run is eliminated. Under the
new law the attorney is given a positive starting time for the
running of the delay for applying for a new trial. It should be
noted that there is no provision in the new Code for a rehearing
in the trial court.
ACTION OF NULLITY
The Code of Practice divided the action for nullity into two
classes, that for vices of form, and that for vices of substance. 19
Although there was no express statutory rule on the time for
allowing a judgment to be attacked for a vice of form (absolute
nullity), the jurisprudential rule was that such a judgment could
be attacked at any time unless there had been an acquiescence
in the judgment.20 This rule was expressed in Brana v. Brana,2 1
which held that the judgment of any tribunal in a matter in
which it lacked jurisdiction ratione materiae was an absolute
nullity, and could be treated as such whenever and wherever it
was sought to be made a ground of action or defense. As for
vices of substance, the Code of Practice allowed one year to
attack the judgment from the time the fraud or ill practice was
discovered. 22 Articles 2002, 2003, and 2004 of the new Code make
no change in the former law with respect to the time for at-
.tacking the nullity of a judgment.
DELAY FOR CONFIRMING A DEFAULT
If the defendant neither appeared nor filed his answer within
two days exclusive of Sundays and legal holidays after the pre-
19. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 606 (1870) set out the Vices of Form:
"(1) If a judgment has been rendered . . . against a person disqualified by
law from appearing in a suit, as a minor without the assistance of his curator ...
"(2) If the defendant . . .have been condemned by default without having
been cited;
"(3) When the judgment . ..has nevertheless been given by a judge incom-
petent to try the suit ....
"(4) If the defendant has not been legally cited, and has not entered appear-
ance, joined issue, or had not a regular judgment by default taken against him."
Id. art. 607 sets out the Vices of Substance: "A definitive judgment may be an-
nulled in all cases where it appears that it has been obtained through fraud or
other ill practices on the part of the party in whose favor it was rendered ... "
20. Brana v. Brana, 139 La. 305, 71 So. 519 (1916) ; Andrews v. Sheehy, 122
La. 464, 47 So. 771 (1908) ; Key v. Jones, 181 So. 631 (La. App. 1938). LA.
CODE OF PRACTICE art. 612 (1870) provides that there should be no attack on an
incompetent judge or attack for not being properly cited, if he was in the parish
and let the judgment be executed. A jurisprudential rule provided for the acqui-
escence of judgment. Succession of Corrigan, 42 La. Ann. 65, 7 So. 74 (1890)
Andrews v. Sheehy, 125 La. 217, 51 So. 122 (1910).
21. 139 La. 305, 71 So. 519 (1916).
22. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 613 (1870).
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liminary default was rendered, definitive judgment was given
for the plaintiff provided he proved his demand.28 Since the
decision in Frank v. Currie,2 4 Saturdays as well as Sundays were
excluded. Article 1702 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
makes no change as to the time allowed for confirming a de-
fault.25
DELAY FOR TAKING AN APPEAL
Under both the former and the new law, the delays for taking
an appeal may be divided into two general classes - those for
taking a devolutive appeal, and those for taking a suspensive
appeal. The Code of Practice provided that no devolutive appeal,
except as regards minors, could be taken after a year had ex-
pired, to be computed from the day on which the final judgment
was rendered. 26 With reference to minors the delay was com-
puted from the day on which they became of age. The same
article provided that in cases questioning the validity of bonds
or certificates of indebtedness of any public board or political
subdivision, no appeal could be taken after thirty days from
the day judgment was rendered. Under the Revised Statutes
an application for a new trial or rehearing suspended the
running of the time in which appeals could be taken.27 Thus in
Caspari v. Osborne,28 the court held that the delay for appeals
did not commence with rendition, but started as of the effective
date of the judgment. This was the date on which the delays for
applying for a new trial or rehearing expired, or if applied for
timely, the date of refusal of the application.
Article 2087 of the new Code provides that:
"Except as otherwise provided by law, an appeal which
does not suspend the execution of an appealable order or
judgment may be taken, and the security furnished, only
within 90 days of:
"(1) The expiration of the delay for applying for a new
trial as provided by Article 1974, if no application has been
filed timely;
23. Id. art. 312.
24. 172 So. 843 (La. App. 1937).
25. LA. CODE OF Crvm PROCEDURE art. 1702 (1960): "If no answer is filed
timely, this confirmation may be made after two days, exclusive of holidays."
26. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 593 (1870).
27. LA. R.S. 13:4214 (1950).
28. 169 La. 983, 126 So. 500 (1930). See also Lacaze v. Hardee, 7 So.2d 719
(La. App. 1941) ; Comment, 9 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 509 (1949).
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"(2) The court's refusal to grant a timely application
for a new trial, if the applicant is not entitled to notice of
such refusal under Article 1914; or
"(3) The date of the mailing of notice of the court's re-
fusal to grant a timely application for a new trial, if the
applicant is entitled to such notice under Article 1914."
This article reduces the time for taking a devolutive appeal from
one year to ninety days. It also makes the delay for the taking
of a devolutive appeal dependent upon the rules for application
for a new trial.
Formerly, a suspensive appeal could be taken at any time
before the judgment became executory.29 Judgments became
executory ten days, exclusive of Sundays, after the expiration
of the delay to apply for a new trial, or ten days from the re-
jection of the application for a new trial. The new Code allows
a suspensive appeal to be taken only within fifteen days of (1)
the expiration of the delay for applying for a new trial, (2) the
court's refusal to grant a timely application for a new trial if
the appellant is not entitled to notice of this refusal, and (3)
the date of the mailing of notice of the refusal, if the appellant
is entitled to notice under Article 1914.30 This increases the time
for applying for a suspensive appeal from ten to fifteen days
and also provides for a uniform date for the commencing of the
running of the delay.
There were other rules under the former law which governed
appeals in specific types of cases. Revised Statutes 13:4452 al-
lowed no appeal on a judgment of separation or divorce after
thirty days from the judgment. Any appeal from a preliminary
injunction had to be made within ten days from the entry of
such order or decree.3 1 Article 307 of the Civil Code required
that an appeal from a judgment appointing or removing a tutor
had to be made within thirty days of the nomination or con-
firmation. Formerly there was no definite time for appealing
29. L.. R.S. 13:4212 (1950).
30. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2123 (1960): ... an appeal. . .may
be taken ... only within 15 days of:
"(1) The expiration of the delay for applying for a new trial, as provided by
Article 1974, if no application has been filed timely;
"(2) The court's refusal to grant a timely application for a new trial, if the
applicant is not entitled to notice of such refusal under Article 1914; or
"(3) The date of the mailing of notice of the court's refusal to grant a timely
application for a new trial, if the applicant is entitled to such notice under Article
1914."
31. LA. R.S. 13:4070 (1950).
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from a judgment appointing or removing a curator.3 2 Another
rule was set forth in the case of State ex rel. Mallu v. Judge,83
which held that an appeal from a judgment of eviction must be
made within twenty-four hours of rendition.
There is no change in the new Code in the time to appeal
from a judgment of separation, divorce, or annulment, nor is
there any change in the time for appealing from a judgment
of eviction.34 Similarly, there is no change in the time to appeal
from a judgment appointing or removing a tutor, but the starting
date is changed to allow the delay to commence in accordance
with the delay for taking a regular suspensive appeal. 85 A
definite time of thirty days is set forth in Article 4548 for ap-
pealing from a judgment appointing or removing a curator, the
period to begin in the same manner as provided for taking a
suspensive appeal in Article 2123. This is a complete change,
as there was no definite time for such an appeal under the for-
mer law.3 6 The time for appealing from a preliminary injunction
is changed from ten to fifteen days37 to be consistent with the
new delay for applying for a suspensive appeal.
There was also a separate set of rules for appealing from
city courts in certain areas. A suspensive appeal from a city
court in New Orleans where the amount was less than $100 had
to be taken within ten days of the rendition of the judgment.38
If the amount was over $100, the period within which to appeal
was ten days, exclusive of Sundays, from the judgment.3 9 Only
New Orleans had these special statutes; the time for appealing
in the rest of the state was the same as that for appealing from
the district courts. One year was allowed for a devolutive ap-
peal in all city courts except that of New Orleans, where the ap-
plicable delay was the same for a devolutive as for a suspensive
appeal. 40 Under the new Code the delay for appealing from city
32. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 395 (1870).
33. 128 La. 914, 55 So. 574 (1911).
34. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3942 (judgment of separation, divorce,
or annulment), art. 4735 (judgment of eviction) (1960).
35. Id. art. 4068. Under Civil Code Article 307 the thirty-day period com-
menced on the day of the judgment decreeing the nomination or confirmation. This
new Code article makes the starting date depend on the correct time set out in the
three classes in Article 2123. (These three are set out in note 30 supra.)
36. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 395 (1870). This article sets out the appoint-
ment, but no time is given. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PaOCEDURE art. 4548, Re-
porter's Comments (1960).
37. LA. CODE OF CIvIL PROCEDURE art. 3612 (1960).
38. LA. 11.S. 13:1951 (1950) ; LA. CODE OF Pa&cICE art. 1131 (1870).
39. LA. 11S. 13:1971 (1950).
40. It is submitted that since the special statute was only applicable to New
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courts is fixed at ten days in all cases.41 This changes the num-
ber of days for appealing only in New Orleans city courts.
However, the starting date for the delay for appealing is changed
in cases involving more than $100. The new Code provides that
the delay starts after the expiration of the delay for a new trial,
or the denial of a new trial if one is applied for.42 Under the
former law the delay started as of the signing of the judgment.4
APPELLATE DELAYS
Under the former law the judges were required to fix the
return day for appeals in the order granting the appeal. In all
cases appealable to the Supreme Court and to the First and
Second Circuits of the Courts of Appeal, the return day had to
be fixed at not less than fifteen nor more than sixty days. 44
However, the return day for appeals from the district court to
the Court of Appeal for the Parish of Orleans was required to
be not less than fifteen nor more than thirty days from the date
of the order granting the appeal. The new Code requires the
trial court to fix the return day of the appeal in the order grant-
ing the appeal at not more than sixty days from the date the
appeal is granted. 45 This article establishes a uniform period in
all appellate courts with discretion still left in the judge to
extend the return day for sufficient cause. The fifteen-day
minimum is done away with and the maximum is raised in the
Orleans Court of Appeal from thirty to sixty days.
In New Iberia National Bank v. Lyons,46 the Supreme Court
announced a rule of practice by which the appellant was allowed
Orleans, the general rule was applicable to appeals from city courts elsewhere in
the state.
41. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 4899 (less than $100 everywhere except
New Orleans), art. 4922 (less than $100 for New Orleans), art. 5002 (more than
$100 for entire state) (1960). Although the statute in question is not express, it
is submitted that Article 5002 does apply to New Orleans as well as the rest of the
state.
There is one exception provided for in Article 4972. This is the provision cover-
ing the old clerk's book statute for cases outside of New Orleans where the district
court and the justice of the peace court had concurrent jurisdiction. There the
delay was the same as in city courts.
42. Id. art. 5002.
43. LA. R.S. 13:1971 (1950).
44. Id. 13:4437 (sets the return day for the Orleans Court of Appeal), 13:4438
(sets the return day for the Supreme Court and courts of appeal, New Orleans
excepted).
45. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2125 (1960). This article appears in
LA. R.S. 13:4446 (1950) and applies to both civil and criminal cases. It was not
repealed in connection with the adoption of the new Code so that it would still
apply to criminal cases.
46. 164 La. 1017, 115 So. 130 (1927).
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a three-day period of grace following the original return day
within which to file the transcript. In addition, he might apply
for an extension of the period in which he could file the tran-
script. If the transcript was not filed within the three days
or within the granted extension, there were no further days of
grace allowed. 47 It should be noted that under the former law
the jurisprudence appeared to hold that it was the duty of the
appellant to file the record when an appeal was taken to the
Supreme Court and the Orleans Court of Appeal, 48 but that it
was the duty of the clerk of court when an appeal was taken
to the other courts of appeal. Article 2127 of the new Code
places the duty of filing the transcript on the clerk of the trial
court. He must lodge it by the return day or any extension
thereof, but a failure of the clerk to comply will not prejudice
the appeal. This article eliminates the former rule which per-
mitted filing of the transcript within three days of the return
day. It also places a uniform duty on the clerk to file the tran-
script.
Although there was some conflict on the point in the Code
of Practice, it was settled that no answer was required by the
appellee.4 9 However, if the appellee did answer, he had to do
so at least three days before the date for argument, provided
that in the courts of appeal such answers would be allowed before
argument within the first three days of the term. 50 No answer
was necessary if the appellee sought only a confirmation of the
judgment.5' Article 2133 of the new Code makes clear that an
appellee shall not be required to file an answer, but if he does,
it must be not later than fifteen days after the return day or the
lodging of the record, whichever is later. This changed the rule
permitting filing of an answer three days before argument or
within the first three days of the term.
A jurisprudential rule required the appellee to file his mo-
47. New Iberia Nat. Bank v. Lyons, 164 La. 1017, 115 So. 130 (1927).
48. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 585 (1870). This article placed the duty of pre-
paring the record on appeal upon the clerk of the trial court. This was the posi-
tion taken by the first and second circuit courts of appeal. Succession of Bickham,
197 So. 924 (La. App. 1940) ; Wilson v. Lee, 196 So. 373 (La. App. 1940).
LA. CODE OF PRACTICE arts. 587, 883, 884 (1870) indicated that it was the duty
of the appellant to have the record lodged on time. This was the position taken by
the Supreme Court and the Orleans Court of Appeal. Cann v. Ruston State
Bank, 155 La. 283, 99 So. 221 (1924).
49. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2133, Reporter's Comment (a) (1960).
50. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 890 (1870).
51. Of. id. art. 890. This article provided that the appellee could answer up
until the day of argument if he sought only a confirmation of the judgment with
costs. However, in practice no answer was required.
[Vol. XXI
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tion to dismiss levelled at .an error or irregularity in the order
of the appeal or appeal bond within three days after the return
day or extended return day.5 2 Of course, the appellant had to be
allowed a chance to correct the error. Article 2161 of the new
Code codifies these rules.
An aggrieved party could apply for a rehearing in all the
appellate courts within fourteen days of the rendition of the
judgment.53 A 1958 amendment to Louisiana Constitution Ar-
ticle VII, Section 24, requires notice of the rendition of judg-
-ment in the courts of appeal before the commencement of the
delay. This constitutional amendment changed the law only for
the Orleans Court of Appeal, as notice was already required by
the other courts of appeal. Article 2166 of the new Code allows
a party to apply to an appellate court for a rehearing for
fourteen days after notice of the rendition of the judgment. This
article also reiterates the requirement of notice of the judgment
before the delay for applying for a rehearing begins.
DELAY FOR PLEADING EXCEPTIONS
Code of Practice Article 333 required that all dilatory and
declinatory exceptions be pleaded in limine litis, before issue
joined. The meaning of these terms was unclear and unworkable
in practice,54 and in the case of Phipps v. Snodgrass,55 it was
held that these exceptions could be filed before answer or judg-
ment by default. Article 333 also required that all dilatory ex-
ceptions be filed at the same time. In State v. Younger,56 it was
held that under Article 333, declinatory exceptions as well as
dilatbry exceptions properly speaking had to be filed at the
same time. Article 928 of the new Code codifies the test of
Phipps v. Snodgrass, and requires that declinatory and dilatory
exceptions be filed before answer or confirmation of judgment
by default ;57 thus-there is no change from the former law. There
52. Esparros v. Vicknair, 191 La. 193, 184 So. 745 (1938) ; D'Angelo v. Nico-
losi, 188 La. 326, 177 So. 64 (1937).
53. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 24; LA. R.S. 13:4446 (1950). One exception was
provided in R.S. 13:4446. This was the case of a de novo appeal from the city
court in New Orleans directly to the court of appeal in cases involving $100 or
less. In such cases the party had five days to apply for a rehearing.
54. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 928, Reporter's Comment (1960).
55. 31 Ia. Ann. 88, 90 (1879). "We held in this case that it was too late after
judgment by default or answer, to plead to the jurisdiction of the court ratione
personae."
56. 206 La. 1037, 20 So.2d 305 (1944). See also Note, 19 TUL. L. REv. 460
(1945).
57. LA.,CODE OF ,CwrL PROCEDURE art. 928 (1960) : "The declinatory exception
19601]
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is also no change in the new Code from the rule requiring that
declinatory and dilatory exceptions be filed at the same time.5 8
Succession of Douglass59 recognized the rule of Code of Prac-
tice Article 34660 that a peremptory exception could be filed at
any stage of the proceeding previous to definitive judgment.
They could even be filed in appellate courts. No change is con-
templated in the new Code in the the time for filing the peremp-
tory exception.6 1
DELAYS FOR INCIDENTAL DEMANDS
Under the former law the time for filing an incidental de-
mand varied with the nature of the particular demand. Com-
pensation could be demanded at any stage of the proceeding
though in practice this was not allowed to retard the progress
of the suit.6 2 The Code of Practice was silent as to when a
reconventional demand could be filed, but in practice it had to
be filed before answer so as not to change the issues.63 The
third party practice act did not contain rules as to when a peti-
tion for a third party demand could be made. Intervention had
to be filed in such time as not to retard the progress of the suit."
The Code of Practice was silent on third opposition, though it
had to be filed before judicial sale. 65 Article 1033 of the new
Code allows incidental demands to be filed up to and including
the time of the answer to the principal demand and later with
leave of court, if it will not retard the progress of the principal
action. This article provides a definite time limit for the in-
cidental actions, which was lacking in the former law. The
article continues to recognize the notion that the filing of the
incidental demand cannot retard the progress of the suit.
and the dilatory exception shall be pleaded prior to answer or judgment by de-
fault. When both exceptions are pleaded, they shall be filed at the same time.
...The peremptory exception may be pleaded at any stage of the proceeding in
the trial court prior to a submission of the case for a decision."
58. Ibid.
59. 225 La. 65, 72 So.2d 262 (1954) (the appellate court has discretion to
consider a peremption exception so filed, or not.) See also Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court - Civil Procedure, 15 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 376, 393 (1955).
60. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 346 (1870): "Peremptory exceptions, founded
on law, may be pleaded in every stage of the action, previous to the definitive
judgment; . . ." There were exceptions to this article in LA. R.S. 13:5063-5064
(1950) which will not be considered here.
61. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 928, Reporter's Comment (1960).
62. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 367 (1870). See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
art. 1033, Reporter's Comment (1960).
63. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1033, Reporter's Comment (1960).
64. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 391 (1870).
65. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1033, Reporter's Comment (1960).
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COMMENTS
DELAY BEFORE EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT
The Code of Practice provided that the party in whose favor
a judgment was rendered could only proceed to the execution
after the delay for a suspensive appeal had elapsed.66 There were
decisions to the effect that an execution before the expiration of
the delay was not ipso facto null, but the defendant would be
counted as having ratified the execution by failing to apply time-
ly for a suspensive appeal. 6T No change is made in the new Code
concerning the delay by the party in whose favor a judgment
was rendered before having the judgment executed.68
FINALITY OF JUDGMENT IN THE APPEAL COURT
Under the former law a judgment became final if the Su-
preme Court when the delay for a rehearing expired, or when the
Supreme Court denied the application where such an application
was timely filed.0 In the courts of appeal the judgment became
final when the delay for a rehearing expired, or thirty days after
the denial of a rehearing where one was timely applied for, if no
application for a writ to the Supreme Court was made, and when
the Supreme Court denied the writ where application for one
was made.70 The new Code codifies this procedure. 71
DISMISSAL FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION
The Civil Code provided that if five years elapsed and there
was no prosecution of a suit, it was considered abandoned.72 The
new Code of Civil Procedure carries forward this rule and re-
peals the Civil Code article. 78
66. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 624 (1870).
67. Wheeling Pottery Co. v. Levi, 48 La. Ann. 777, 19 So. 752 (1896); Sowle
& Ward v. Pollard, 14 La. Ann. 287 (1859).
68. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2252 (1960): "A judgment creditor
may proceed with the execution of a judgment only after the delay for a suspensive
appeal therefrom has elapsed."
69. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 11: "... provided, however, that the Supreme Court
shall in no case exercise the power conferred by this Article unless the application
shall have been made to the court or to one of the justices thereof within thirty
days after a rehearing shall have been refused by the Court of Appeal; and pro-
vided further, that the judgment of the Court of Appeal shall not become execu-
tory until the expiration of thirty days; or, in cases in which application is made
for the writ of review, or other writs, until the decision of the Supreme Court
upon the application shall have become final." LA. R.S. 13:4446 (1950).
70. See note 69 supra.
71. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2167 (1960).
72. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3519 (1870) : "Whenever the plaintiff having made his
demand shall at any time before obtaining final judgment allow five years to
elapse without having taken any steps in the prosecution thereof, he shall be con-
sidered as having abandoned the same."
73. LA. CoDE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2165 (1960).
1960].-
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
. SUPERVISORY JURISDICTION
Article VII, Section 10, of the Louisiana Constitution gives
the Supreme Court control and general supervision over inferior
courts, including the authority to determine the delays for apply-
ing for supervisory writs. The new Code makes no change in
this area.7 4
EFFCTIVE DATE OF THE CODE
Act 15 of 1960 provides in Section 4 (B) (2) (a) that none of
the provisions of the new Code shall decrease or shorten any
procedural delay granted or allowed by any law in existence im-
mediately prior to, and which had commenced to run but had not
yet completely elapsed on, the effective date of this act. An ex-
ample of the importance of this provision is found in the devolu-
tive appeal. If judgment is rendered on December 1, 1960, the
appellant will still have one year to appeal even though the new
Code goes into effect January 1, 1961, and would allow only
ninety days for a devolutive appeal.
Sam J. Friedman
Venue
The section of the Code of Civil Procedure entitled "Venue"
contains the provisions relating to the parish in which an action
must or may be brought. Some special venue provisions are
found in other sections of the Code, as well as the Revised Stat-
utes, but the over-all result has been a comprehensive consolida-
tion of the rules of venue and the elimination of much duplica-
tion.1
The concept of jurisdiction in Louisiana was formerly sub-
divided into jurisdiction ratione materiae and jurisdiction ra-
74. Id. art. 2201.
1. The 1960 acts, in conjunction with the Code of Civil Procedure, amended
or repealed 11 articles of the Revised Civil Code and 20 provisions of the Revised
Statutes of 1950 on the subject of venue. With regard to the Code of Practice
of 1870, approximately 34 articles dealt with venue, either directly or indirectly.
The venue provisions now found in the Revised Statutes are of a particularized
nature, not warranting inclusion in the Code itself. The venue provisions for-
merly found in the Civil Code were removed, and only matters relating to the
cause of action remain. Examination of the acts of 1960 reveals that the follow-
ing articles of the Louisiana Civil Code relating to venue were either repealed
or amended so as to remove the venue provision: Articles 142, 307, 935, 1101,
1113, 1114, 1162, 1193, 1210, 1327.
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